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1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (sustaining the power of the City to “take” private property by eminent
domain for economic development purposes).  The closeness and significance of this case are underscored
by the Court’s 5-4 vote, and by the fact that over forty amicus briefs were filed in this proceeding.
2. This latter movement is (at least in part) a direct response to the Kelo majority’s invitation.  Justice
Stevens pointedly noted: “We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.  Indeed, many States already impose ‘public use’
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.” Id. at 2668.  See, e.g., States Act to Protect Private
Property in Wake of Ruling, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 20, 2005 at A4.
3. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (sustaining as a public use the eminent domain taking of a viable business
structure located within a blighted neighborhood that was targeted for redevelopment).
4. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (sustaining as a public use the eminent domain taking of privately held land
areas for the purpose of effectuating a broader, a less oligopolistic pattern of land ownership).
5. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).  In the context of a valid pesticide regulation and licensing program, the
Supreme Court held that any disclosure of submitted information/data, even trade secret information, is for
a “public use” and is not a taking of property.  Id. at 1016. Two factors motivated the Court’s thinking—
first, much of the information/data submitted is not trade secret information; moreover, it is voluntarily
submitted in exchange for the economic advantages of “registration”; id. at 1007. Second, statutory
mechanisms exist that provide “just compensation” to the party whose trade secret information is disclosed.
Id. at 1019. It is also important to recognize that this case, though cited by the Kelo majority, is inapposite;
it does not involve an eminent domain taking of property, as Kelo itself, Berman and Midkiff all did.  It
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INTRODUCTION 
No eminent domain taking case in the last twenty-five years has excited the level
of interest, attention, and debate as has Kelo v. City of New London.1  The Supreme
Court’s decision has not quelled that debate.  If anything the stridency, the emotional
tenor, of the debate has increased.  And in the few months since the decision came
down, several dozen states (in the absence of any meaningful federal limitation on what
constitutes “public use”) have proposed statutes or constitutional amendments that
would limit their exercise of eminent domain (taking) powers.2  There is even talk of
federal legislation to temper, to modify, if not overrule, the holding in Kelo.  Whether,
and/or which of these state proposals will be enacted—whether federal legislation will
come to pass is, of course, problematic at this point.  But these conjectures and
possible state or federal legislative responses to Kelo are not the purpose of this
Article.  
What seems more useful is a delineation of the Kelo case itself, and in particular,
the root cases Kelo relied upon; Berman v. Parker,3 Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,4 and to a somewhat lesser extent, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.5  Part I of this
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arises out of a police power regulatory program that was not challenged by Monsanto; the Court’s holding,
i.e., that a “regulatory taking” had not occurred and that public purpose requirements were amply met lends
little, if any, support to the Kelo majority’s reasoning.  See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
6. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d
500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
7. Id. at 2661.
8. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-35 (1954).  Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court
Article will argue that Kelo was wrongly decided in at least three important respects:
the facts in Kelo are fundamentally different from the facts in the cases purportedly
relied upon by the Kelo majority; the Kelo Court misunderstands or misstates the
doctrine of “deference”; and finally, the sequencing of reasoning undertaken by the
Kelo Court is both at odds with the cases relied upon, and is little more than an “ends
justifies means” approach that puts a wide range of constitutionally protected rights at
risk (not just the property rights of the Kelo homeowners)—a dangerous precedent.
Part II of the Article would recognize, and suggests ending, an unfortunate dichotomy
between the Supreme Court’s handling of “regulatory taking” cases, and those “taking”
cases that arise in eminent domain settings such as Kelo, Berman, and Midkiff.  The
argument is made that this dichotomy ought at long last to be bridged—it is
inexplicable, it cannot be justified, and it produces unfair (dangerous even) results.
The opportunity to harmonize these two strands of our takings jurisprudence was
missed in Kelo.  But there will be other cases, and hopefully a Supreme Court better
prepared to tackle this essential task.
I.  THE KELO HOLDING—THE OPINION OF THE COURT
Justice Stevens begins the five-member majority opinion by extensively laying out
the history and underlying facts of the case, including the rationale and thinking of the
city of New London, the state of Connecticut (which consistently supported the city’s
efforts), the trial court, and the Connecticut Supreme Court.  At no point do any of
these entities, nor does the Stevens majority, see the motivational impetus for the
eminent domain takings that took place here as anything other than “economic
revitalization”; the overall plan was “projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs, to
increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city,
including its downtown and waterfront areas.”6  Stevens’ concluding statement in
section II of his opinion couldn’t be more direct: “We granted certiorari to determine
whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic development
[without more] satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”7  Kelo,
obviously holds that it does.  But this conclusion, purportedly relying on the Supreme
Court’s prior holdings in Berman, Midkiff, and Ruckelshaus raises some important next
questions—was this reliance justified?  Is the Kelo holding required by these prior
cases, or does it represent an unwarranted, an ominous, extension of reasoning that
should have been rejected?
We begin answering these questions by noting that the Kelo case is factually
different in many important respects from the cases upon which it purports to rely.  For
example, in Berman, the eminent domain takings were rooted in the reality of, and
need for, “slum” or “blight” removal, which then allowed a program of public and
private redevelopment (akin to New London’s) to be undertaken.8  In Kelo, however,
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in Berman, makes clear that it is the removal of the overwhelming number of “blighted” and “slum”
structures and conditions in the area that is the glue that legitimizes the takings, and thereafter, the
subsequent scheme of renewal.  See id.     
9. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
10. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 30.
11. Id. at 34.
12. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2664-65.  At several points in the majority opinion,
Stevens, in a strained effort to draw closer to Berman, and as part of his rationale for justifying the
challenged eminent domain takings, equates the economically “distressed” character of the Fort Trumbull
area with the “slum” characteristics in Berman.  See id.  He then asserts that “a program of economic
rejuvenation is entitled to our [Berman-type] deference.”  Id. at 2665.  But he has manufactured this
economic distress/slum and/or blighted conditions analogy out of whole cloth; he cites no statute(s) or case
law that has equated the two, or defined the degree of economic distress needed to put it on a par with slum
and/or blighted conditions for the purpose of justifying an eminent domain taking.  In fact, the two are quite
different—regions of a state, whole states, groups of states are more or less economically distressed,
whereas slum and/or blighted conditions are more local in character, capable of being more precisely
defined and geographically delineated.  In sum, the facts in Kelo are quite different from those in Berman;
asserting the contrary does not make it so; and extending Berman-type deference to Kelo is both
unwarranted and negates important Fifth Amendment protections.  
13. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo recognized and cited some of the same data that the Berman
decision turned on, i.e., the actuality of blight and slum conditions.  The removal of these conditions
justified the use of eminent domain powers—not the subsequent reutilization of the acquired properties.
See id. at 2672-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
14. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 32.
there is no threshold justification for the use of eminent domain powers.  Justice
Stevens expressly acknowledges that, with respect to the fifteen properties held by nine
separate owners that were joined in the litigation, “[t]here is no allegation that any of
these properties is blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were
condemned only because they happen to be located in the development area.”9  In
Berman, Justice Douglas relies heavily on the fact that 64.3% of the structures in the
project area were “beyond repair,” and that another 18.4% needed “major repairs.”10
He accepts the Congressional judgment (and expert opinion) that deterioration of this
magnitude cannot be remedied “on a structure by structure basis . . . . It was important
to redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the conditions that cause slums . . . .”11
When one looks at the larger project area in Kelo, there is no indication in the record
that any of the properties acquired by the New London Development Corporation
(whether by condemnation or market transaction) were in a “rundown,” “slum,” or
“blighted” condition, or that any such designation hung over the neighborhood as a
whole.  Again, Justice Stevens’ opinion acknowledges this factual difference:  “Those
who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort
Trumbull area . . . .”12 
In short, the Berman Court does not begin its analysis or justify the challenged
taking by focusing on the economic and/or social utility of the redevelopment scheme.
Instead, the Court begins, and justifies the challenged taking, by focusing on the harms,
the reality and pervasiveness of the blight, and the slum conditions.  It is the
amelioration of these conditions that triggers and justifies the use of governmental
power (including the power of eminent domain).13  Justice Douglas sees the
governmental actions in Berman (the amelioration of blight and slum conditions) as
falling within “what traditionally has been known as the police power.”14  Once the
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15. Id. at 33.
16. Justice Douglas’ recognition of this latter point produced a colorful and much quoted line of dicta:
“It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”  Id.  However, it is
important to note that this oft-cited deference of the Berman Court to legislative decision-making applied
only to the disposition of acquired properties, the course of conduct that followed a valid acquisition or
eminent domain taking of property.  The eminent domain challenge itself in Berman and prior cases was
subject to a far more rigorous (a far less deferential) judicial analysis.  See e.g., Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay,
60 Me. 124, 139 (1872); Concord Railroad v. Greely, 17 N.H. 47, 56-57 (1845); Ryerson v. Brown, 35
Mich. 333, 336 (1877).   The Kelo holding may change that, but it is important to note that the Kelo Court
seems to read Berman deference far more broadly than did the Berman Court itself. 
17. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.  In this regard, the Kelo holding embraces the
precise rationale adopted by Michigan’s Supreme Court in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 634 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the anticipated benefit to the municipality of
“alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community” was a sufficient basis
to justify the challenged eminent domain takings.).  There were strong dissents in Poletown, the most
notable by Justice Ryan; Poletown was later overruled by Michigan’s highest court in County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  The overruling of Poletown took place after the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s decision in the Kelo case, but before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.  Timing
aside, what is clear is that the reasoning of Michigan jurists in the dissents in Poletown, and the unanimous
views overruling Poletown expressed in County of Wayne, obviously did not dissuade the Kelo majority
from adopting a view of “public use” that is so expansive that it seems to have swallowed the Fifth
Amendment’s limitations that were originally designed to protect private property from the very sort of
eminent domain taking that is today sanctioned.
18. This very risk was recognized early on by no less an authority than constitutional scholar Thomas
Cooley, then Michigan’s Chief Justice, in Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877).  In striking down a mill
dam flowage statute authorizing the eminent domain taking of private land on the theory that the public
would be benefited, Cooley noted that “every lawful business does this.”  Id. at 339.  See also THOMAS
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 763-73 (7th ed. 1903).  In particular, Justice
Cooley notes that “a due protection to the rights of private property will preclude the government from
seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of public benefit to
spring from the more profitable use to which the latter may devote it.”  Id. at 766.  Justice Cooley goes on
to acknowledge that a benefit theory allowing the eminent domain taking of private property had gained
basis for an exercise of this power is established, or as Justice Douglas put it, “[o]nce
the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise
of eminent domain is clear.”15  And at this point (but not before) the rest of the holding
in Berman logically follows: acquired properties/neighborhoods may be renewed/
redeveloped; public and/or private instrumentalities may be utilized to achieve these
ends; the scope and character of the renewal/redevelopment is for policymakers to
decide.16  
The Kelo majority, however, begins its eminent domain analysis by proceeding in
exactly the reverse order.  In a classic example of “ends” justifying “means,” it holds
that the projected, as yet unrealized, problematic benefits to the community that the
largely private program of economic revitalization anticipates is sufficient, in and of
itself, to justify the challenged eminent domain takings.  In constitutional jargon, the
takings are held to “satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”17
Justice Stevens either ignores or fails to realize that this reasoning subjects all private
property to the very real risk of being taken by eminent domain because all renewals,
economic revitalization projects, industrial development projects, whatever, are
capable of being cast in glowing terms that project greater or lesser future benefits.18
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some adherents and some case law support, in his day.  He clearly regards these inroads, however, as unwise
and a threat to private property rights that is inconsistent with the common law, arguing that “the common
law has never sanctioned an appropriation of property based upon these considerations alone.” Id. at 768.
In addition, Cooley regards this as a minority point of view, which many (even in those states that had
adopted a benefit theory) regarded as, “not sound in principle . . . .”  Id. at 773. More recently in County
of Wayne, the Michigan Supreme Court noted: 
Every business, every productive unit in society . . . contribute[s] in some way to the
commonwealth.  To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact
that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the
economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on the government’s
power of eminent domain.
Id. at 786.
19. The Kelo Court’s rejection of “public use” (as that term has evolved over the years) as a
justification for the exercise of eminent domain power seems both self-serving and disingenuous. Its
characterization of this standard as “difficult to administer” and “impractical,” Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. at 2662, fails to acknowledge that most courts had long ago abandoned the most literal
interpretation of this term in favor of a more practical, more realistic approach, but an approach that
nonetheless avoided an overly broad “public purpose” or “public benefit” standard that would have the
effect of entirely swallowing the Fifth Amendment’s limitations, of vitiating the protections of private
property that the constitutional language intended.  See Judge Ryan’s dissent in Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455,
476-80 (Mich. 1981), which subsequently was embraced by Michigan’s highest court when Poletown was
repudiated (Ryan, J., dissenting).  See also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781-83 (Mich.
2004) and infra note 97.
20. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229, 232 (1984) (laying out this historical background).
This self-serving stratagem then allows the use of eminent domain powers to assemble
whatever parcel of land is deemed necessary.  This is the bottom line holding of the
Kelo majority.  It is produced by the reverse logic the Court has utilized (looking at
“ends” to justify the “means”), and by the facile substituting of a “benefit” theory of
justification for the use of eminent domain powers, instead of adhering to the actual
language of the Fifth Amendment which speaks of “public use,” albeit a more ex-
panded range or type of “public use” today than might have obtained a century ago.19
Turning to the Kelo Court’s reliance on Midkiff, we see the same problems noted
above, i.e., a failure to take into account the factual differences in the two cases and too
great a willingness to rely on the “deference” dicta in Midkiff as a way of avoiding the
more difficult task of determining whether the eminent domain takings in Kelo (and the
reasoning used to support those takings) are really supportable in a manner that
respects Fifth Amendment limitations.  The factual differences in the two cases are
striking.  Midkiff presented a unique situation; a highly concentrated pattern of land
ownership borne of customs and traditions that go back to the earliest years of
Polynesian settlement and that predated Hawaii’s statehood by hundreds of years.
Failed efforts to broaden this oligarchical pattern of land ownership began in the early
1800s.20  After Hawaii became a state, legislation intended to finally, and forever,
broaden the base of private land ownership was enacted in 1967; this policy choice by
Hawaii is both appropriate and permissible, and does little more than bring Hawaii’s
pattern of land ownership in line with patterns of land ownership in all of the other
states.  The legislation authorized the eminent domain taking of a portion of a historic
landowner’s vast holdings, and the subsequent resale of small individual tracts of that
land to long-term lessees of these tracts.  On its face it is the quintessential (and
generally prohibited) taking of A’s land for the purpose of resale to B; this fact, and
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21. See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Special Report: Corporate Welfare, Time Magazine,
Nov. 9, Nov. 16, Nov. 23, Nov. 30, 1998.  In the first installment of this four-part report the authors point
out that the level of subsidy at state and local government levels is difficult to document but that, “the figure
is in the many billions of dollars each year—and is growing . . . .”  Nov. 9 issue at 39.  See also Dale F.
Rubin, The Public Pays, The Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of the Public Purpose Doctrine and
a Not-For-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311 (1994).
22. A discussion of the wisdom of such programs is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say
such programs, when challenged, have consistently been found to meet “public purpose”
requirements—they have become an integral part of modern government, particularly at state and local
levels of government.  Accordingly, this paper, without comment, simply takes such programs as a given.
Aimed at facilitating some aspect of economic development, job growth, etc., revitalization programs are
largely predicated on executive/legislative policy making, taxing, bonding, and spending powers, though
as in Midkiff and Kelo, the conferral of eminent domain powers on some implementing body like the
Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) or the New London Development Corporation (NLDC) is not unusual.
See, e.g., Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (sustaining economic develop-
ment grants to private corporations); C.L.E.A.N. v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996) (sustaining taxes
and expenditures facilitating construction of a baseball stadium for the Seattle Mariners); Hayes v. State
Prop. and Bldgs. Comm’n, 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987) (sustaining state subsidies to induce construction
of a Toyota manufacturing plant).  
more than ten years of actual land takings and resale(s) eventually led to the Midkiff
litigation in 1979.  The Supreme Court’s holding in the case sustained the underlying
legislative policy (a more diversified statewide pattern of private property ownership
was approved) and the eminent domain takings that were essential to the unfolding of
that policy.  But everyone realized the obvious, i.e., that Hawaii’s singular pattern of
land ownership would not remedy itself.  Moreover, this pattern of land ownership did
not exist in any other state, and thus, no other state would require a program of eminent
domain takings and land resale(s) similar to Hawaii’s.  In sum, the eminent domain
takings (and land resales) sustained in Midkiff arose from a unique historical setting
that required unique governmentally sponsored remedial policies.  The setting and the
remedial policies would almost certainly never arise again in Hawaii or in any other
state.
The facts in Kelo are exactly the opposite.  Unlike Midkiff’s unique set of customs,
circumstances, and traditions that concentrated the ownership of private property—a
reality that cried out for remedial relief—Kelo-type economic (commercial, industrial,
and/or mixed-use) revitalization programs are occurring in every state.  They are found
in urban and rural settings, in rich and poor states, and in states with growing
populations and those with more stable populations.  Nationally such programs number
in the thousands; their scope and character have expanded dramatically in recent
years.21  They are the product of modern economic development thinking—efforts to
grow a state’s tax base and/or employment levels.22  Whatever value such programs
have, they are certainly not the product of facts and circumstances that in any way
parallel or resemble Midkiff and/or that justified the eminent domain taking and land
resale program sustained in Midkiff.  And, unlike Midkiff, which produced a single,
geographically limited program of eminent taking and land resale(s), the Kelo holding
contains no inherent limits.  It will almost certainly induce a diverse and hugely
expanded number of economic revitalization programs in all parts of the country; each
will be largely private, and each will have its own eminent domain taking and land
resale component.  And unless Kelo is modified, these will continue for an indefinite
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23. See supra text accompanying note 17.
24. See supra note 5.  See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
25. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007.  The Court’s reasoning on this point was undoubtedly
made easier by the inclusion in the 1978 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of
amendments for provisions that compensated those who (in the course of registration) may be compelled
to disclose protected (property-type) trade secret and related information.  Id. at 994-95, particularly n.4.
26. Implicit in the Ruckelshaus Court’s reasoning with respect to the purposes, benefits, and
permissibility of the overall regulatory scheme is a recognition that public purpose requirements have been
met.  Id. at 990-91.  A range of traditional police power health, safety, and general welfare benefits growing
out of the regulatory scheme were unassailable.  The Court goes on to note that Monsanto did not challenge
this overall regulatory scheme; had it, the Court opines that such a challenge would have failed:
But Monsanto has not challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the
marketing and use of pesticides.  Nor could Monsanto successfully make such a challenge,
for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange for “‘the advantage of
living and doing business in a civilized community.’” This is particularly true in an area,
period of time into the future.  A more sweeping sanctioning of the use of eminent
domain powers could hardly be imagined. 
The sweep of Kelo is further broadened by the previously noted willingness of the
Court to proceed in the reverse order it has embraced; it does not look first to more
tangible public use justifications for the use of eminent domain powers, i.e., “slum
removal,” or the need for some public (or quasi-public) facility, or the need to
remediate some unique condition or circumstance.  Instead, it looks first to a
problematic set of benefits which economic revitalization programs are designed to
produce, and then (applying the previously described23 “ends justify means” rationale)
asserts that these as yet unrealized benefits meet Fifth Amendment public use
requirements and thus justify the use of eminent domain powers.  This linkage of
economic (job and tax base creation) policies, the problematic benefits of such
policies, and the use of eminent domain powers as a tool to implement these
problematic policies is unprecedented.  No Supreme Court case prior to Kelo has
fashioned a rationale which allows such a sweeping use of eminent domain powers.
If left unmodified, Kelo essentially eviscerates long-standing Fifth Amendment
limitations on the use of eminent domain. 
As was the case in both Berman and Midkiff, the facts in Ruckelshaus are also far
removed from the facts in Kelo.  To begin with, Ruckelshaus does not involve an
eminent domain taking; the legal question posed was whether a unique, long-standing,
and increasingly sophisticated scheme of comprehensive federal pesticide regulation,
which contained data disclosure provisions as part of the licensing and registration of
new pesticide materials, gave rise to a “regulatory taking.”24  The Ruckelshaus Court
held that it did not.  A near unanimous Court stated: 
Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are
submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government
interest, [comprehensive federal pesticide regulation] a voluntary submission of data
by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly
be called a taking.25 
More important for our purposes, the Ruckelshaus Court held that the regulatory
scheme fully met public purpose requirements; the legislation was intended to and
actually did provide real public health, safety, and environmental protection benefits;26
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such as pesticide sale and use, that has long been the source of public concern and the
subject of government regulation. 
Id. at 1007 (citations omitted).   
27. Id. at 1015.  The Ruckelshaus Court’s full exposition of Congressional intent with respect to FIFRA
regulation begins by recognizing that the most immediate beneficiaries of disclosed information may well
be, “later applicants who will support their applications by citation to data submitted by Monsanto or some
other original submitter.” Id. at 1014.   But the fact that a private party may benefit from the data disclosure
requirements does not negate the fact that public benefits and purposes would also be realized; the latter
were the primary focus of the Congress.  The Court states:   
Congress believed that the [disclosure] provisions would eliminate costly duplication of
research and streamline the registration process, making new end-use products available to
consumers more quickly.  Allowing applicants for registration, upon payment of
compensation to use data already accumulated by others, rather than forcing them to go
through the time-consuming process of repeating the research, [is, in Congress’ view, a
significant factor in opening up the pesticide market place].  
Id. at 1015.  It is also a factor that further meets the public purpose requirements of the law.
it was intended to and actually did provide for the removal of “significant barrier[s] to
entry into the pesticide market, thereby allowing greater competition among producers
of end-use products.”27  There is no reverse logic here; no looking to problematic
benefits to justify the public purpose character of the governmental regulatory powers
being exercised.
The facts in Kelo are different in almost every respect.  In Kelo there is no unique
scheme of comprehensive Federal regulation; instead there are a thousand and one state
and local economic revitalization programs.  In Kelo there is no voluntary participation
in these programs—one’s property is simply delineated as part of a revitalization area;
this triggers the acquisition of all properties in the area; a holdout may have his
property taken by eminent domain.  In Kelo there is no reciprocal economic advantage
to one whose property is condemned; he gets whatever passes for “just compensation,”
but no right to participate in the program of revitalization (akin to the marketing
advantage that “registration” with the framework of FIFRA provides).  In Kelo there
are no immediate health, safety, environmental protection, and pesticide market place
benefits and/or advantages such as those provided under FIFRA/Ruckelshaus; instead
public use/purpose benefits are entirely problematic— economic rejuvenation may (or
may not) occur to some degree, at some point in the future, but the eminent domain
takings of non-blighted private property, as already noted, are immediate, real, and
final.  
Examining the “deference” factor in Berman, Midkiff, and Ruckelshaus, as
compared to Kelo, one must begin by noting that the degree of deference to be
accorded legislative judgments by reviewing courts is not fixed.  When constitutional
limitations exist (such as the Fifth Amendment’s limitations on the use of eminent
domain), the degree of deference must be much less than the broader deference that is
appropriately accorded to executive/legislative policy making, tax, and spending
judgments that go to the manner—the “how,” “why,” and “when” of policy and
program implementation—including the disposition of validly acquired properties. 
In the first instance, constitutional limitations are intended to hedge the legislative
judgment; a more searching, a more probing judicial review is necessary to insure that
constitutional rights and/or duties are honored.  But once it is determined that
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28. See supra text accompanying note 16.
29. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-34 (1984).  It should also be noted that the
over-broad language in Midkiff with respect to deference led some scholars even then to conjecture whether
Fifth Amendment protections of private property (which had been eroding for some time) had not now been
eliminated.  See Thomas J. Coyne, Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for the
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain? 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388 (1985).  Alarmed by this
prospect, the author concludes: “[a]n examination of the potential abuse of eminent domain power and the
little judicial protection offered to private land owners under a deferential standard of review reflects the
unreasonableness of such a holding.”  Id. at 404.    
30. Id. at 241-42. 
31. Id. at 242.
32. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
33. With respect to Congress’ data disclosure provisions, the Court noted:  “It is enough for us to state
that the optimum amount of disclosure to the public is for Congress [and its delegate, the EPA], not the
courts, to decide, and that the statue embodies Congress’ judgment on that question.” Ruckleshaus v.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1015-16.  Moreover Congress’ delegatee, the EPA, is generally accorded Chevron
deference (akin to the policy making and implementation deference accorded legislative and executive arms
of government).  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
constitutional requirements have been met, that questioned eminent domain takings are
justified, it is for the executive and legislative arms of government (largely unfettered)
to determine the manner and timing of program implementation, including the
disposition of validly acquired property interests.  
That is the lesson of Berman—real slums and real blight justified the eminent
domain takings; once the takings were determined to be valid, the Court then accorded
the executive/ legislative judgment wide latitude (“deference”) to determine the manner
and scope of subsequent renewal programs.28  In Midkiff, notwithstanding a perhaps
confusing over-breadth of language with respect to deference, the same approach was
taken.  Justice O’Connor speaking for the Court begins by noting the unique
circumstances, i.e., the historic factors that gave rise to the oligopoly of land
ownership;29 she acknowledges the legitimacy of Hawaii’s effort “to reduce the
perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly . . .”;30 and she ends by noting
that the approach taken to correct the problem (the eminent domain taking of some
land and subsequent land resale(s)) is both necessary and “a comprehensive and
rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure.”31  Having justified the
takings on rather traditional grounds, Justice O’Connor then accords considerable
deference to Hawaii’s legislature and their instrumentality, the Hawaii Housing
Authority to fashion and carry out the mechanics of policy implementation.  In
Ruckelshaus, the considerable degree of deference exercised by the reviewing court
in sustaining FIFRA’s regulatory scheme was more than appropriate.  The case did not
involve an eminent domain taking of property, and legislatively fashioned police power
enactments are normally entitled to judicial respect.  Such deference was even more
appropriate in this case given the considerable degree of health, safety, and general
welfare benefits (including the benefits of data disclosure)32 that the Court
acknowledged, and that met as fully as they did the public purpose requirements of the
law.33
It is also worth noting that the actual holdings in cases cited by both Berman and
Midkiff adhere to the varying deferential standard laid out above, i.e., more judicial
scrutiny of, (less deference with respect to) constitutional questions, while at the same
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36. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
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time extending considerable deference towards executive/legislative judgments with
respect to policy choices, implementation, the handling, and/or disposition of validly
acquired properties.  For example, in Old Dominion Co. v. United States,34 the broad
language of deference cited by Berman and Midkiff almost certainly refers to acts of
Congress and determinations by the Secretary of War in carrying out land
condemnations that on their face did not require deference to be sustained; the
challenged takings fully met constitutional “public use” standards—they were to
acquire “sites for military purposes.”35  Similarly, in United States ex rel Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welsh,36 the questioned condemnations again readily met
constitutional “public use” standards—a public road was being built; no deference was
needed to sustain the challenged takings.  The language of deference in Welsh, cited
by Berman and Midkiff, refers to acts of Congress that cast the powers of the TVA
broadly and required the agency to work with other instrumentalities to implement, (to
carry out) the broad purposes of the act; the Welsh Court notes that:
[The TVA] was particularly admonished to cooperate with other governmental
agencies—federal, state, and local—specifically in relation to the problem of
“readjustment of the population displaced by the construction of dams, the acquisition
of reservoir areas, the protection of watersheds, the acquisition of rights-of-way, and
other necessary acquisitions of land, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.”37 
Welsh found that these mandates were fully complied with.  All of the then existing
federal, state, and county agencies, with any stake in the matter agreed with the TVA
that the selected road site was the most appropriate.  Judicial deference to the
Congressionally mandated powers of the TVA and to the decision making processes
which led to the actual location of the road was fully warranted.  But at the same time,
the Court was aware that the eminent domain takings fully met constitutional “public
use” requirements.  
In sum, the Supreme Court’s holding in each of the cases cited by Kelo did not
turn on “deference” in order to find that constitutional public use requirements were
met.  In Berman, the “public use” justifying the eminent domain takings was the
elimination of existing and widespread blighted conditions (slums).  In Midkiff, it was
the elimination of a damaging, oligarchical system of land holding.  In Old Dominion,
land was condemned for a military base.  In Welsh, land was condemned for a public
road.  And in Ruckelshaus, there was no eminent domain taking of land, nor was there
a regulatory taking; constitutional limitations requiring less deferential judicial review
were not a factor in Ruckelshaus.  The Court found that a broad range of public health,
safety, and general welfare benefits had been amply demonstrated: these findings
sustained the police power enactment.  
The fact that all of these cases contained language (dicta) suggesting the
appropriateness of a high level of judicial deference to executive/legislative policy
making and policy implementation is correct as far as it goes, but the Kelo majority
failed to appreciate that constitutional limitations on legislative power stand on a
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different footing; Fifth Amendment limitations cannot simply be swept away by an
over-broad concept of deference.  The Kelo Court’s review should have been far less
deferential with respect to the eminent domain (the public use) questions posed by the
case.  As noted above, the holdings in all of the cases it cited, Berman, Midkiff, Old
Dominion, and Welsh, found an independent basis for sustaining the challenged
eminent domain takings.  Only then, when constitutional public use requirements were
deemed to have been met, did these courts move to a more deferential standard of
review to deal with other (policy and policy implementation) issues posed by these
cases.  Put another way, the facts in each of these cases demonstrated that Fifth
Amendment limitations on the use of eminent domain powers were not violated;
traditional public use requirements were in fact met.  The language of deference went
only to the implementation, the manner and means by which executive/legislative arms
of government carried out the underlying policies in each of these settings.  
A moment’s reflection suggests that it could hardly be otherwise.  Given our
structure of government and principles of  “separation of powers,” the making of
policy and policy implementing choices is the duty of elected (executive/legislative)
officials; these officials and their decisions are entitled to, and have always received,
a very high degree of judicial deference.  But at the same time, constitutional
limitations on executive/legislative power cannot be avoided or finessed by glib
references to deference.  The monitoring of constitutional duties is the task of the
judicial branch; there is little room for deference.  When challenges arise, courts must
determine (on the facts of the case) whether constitutional requirements have been met.
An early Maine case, Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay,38 put it quite well:
But the legislature have no power to determine finally upon the extent of their
authority over private rights.  This is a power in its nature essentially judicial . . . .
The question whether a statute in a particular instance exceeds the just limits of the
constitution must be determined by the judiciary. . . .  The attempt, therefore, of the
legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain, does not settle that it has the right;
but the existence of the right in the legislature in any class of cases is left to be
determined under the constitution by the courts.39
In Kelo, however, the majority opinion simply ignored the higher level of (less
deferential) scrutiny that constitutional questions (as opposed to executive/legislative
policy choices) require.  While paying lip service to its constitutional duty to assure
that A’s property is not taken “for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private
party B . . .”40 the Court allowed precisely this end result by relying on the language
of deference in each of the four cases noted above, and by lumping together the
eminent domain taking questions with the executive/legislative policy and plan
implementation choices that the case posed.  Given the fact that all economic
revitalization programs can be said to meet broad “public purpose” requirements,41 this
lumping together of constitutional questions and policy choices under the mantle of
“deference” effectively precludes any real or independent discussion of the narrower
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42. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
43. The reference here is to the “ends justify means” analysis employed by the Kelo majority.  See
supra text accompanying note 17.
44. This is precisely the Kelo majority’s reasoning; immediately after referencing Berman, Midkiff, and
Ruckleshaus, the Court states:  
It would be incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic benefits to be
derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than
any of those other interests [the interests served in the cited cases].  Clearly, there is no basis
for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose [which the Court equates with public use].  
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-66.  At another point the Kelo majority approvingly states
that: “The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community . . . .  To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that
specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development.”  Id. at 2665.
constitutional question posed, i.e., are the challenged takings in Kelo valid? 
Deference then, becomes a way of finessing (avoiding) Fifth Amendment limitations
on the exercise of eminent domain powers.  That this is precisely what the Kelo
majority did (and intended to do) couldn’t be more clear: 
When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases
make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried
out in the federal courts . . . .
Just as we decline to second-guess the City’s considered judgments about the
efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City’s
determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project.42
The Kelo Court essentially reduces the important constitutional question it was
charged with determining to just another “socioeconomic” question or debate—a
debate which (in the name of deference) it declines to join.  The net result is both
obvious and unfortunate—the important constitutional question in the case is reduced
to nothing more than one of many socioeconomic policy choices to be made by the
City of New London (or any other city) in working out its economic revitalization
program.  In the name of deference, (a deference far broader than that of any prior
Supreme Court case) the challenged taking in Kelo, is sustained; it follows then, that
any other private property delineated to be within a program of economic
revitalization, is subject to being taken by eminent domain.  Here too, no prior
Supreme Court case has cast the power of eminent domain as broadly.  Put another
way, no prior Supreme Court case has interpreted constitutional limitations as
narrowly—so narrowly as to essentially make them a nullity.  In sum, it seems clear
that the Kelo holding is not required by the language of deference in Berman, Midkiff,
or any other prior Supreme Court case, but represents a significant expansion of the
holding and rationale of these earlier cases.
Finally, the Kelo majority’s analytic departure43 from the cases it purports to rely
upon deserves further comment and critical analysis.  Obviously, the Court’s holding
sustains the challenged takings.  It does so on the basis of the Court’s and New
London’s belief that its economic revitalization plan will create benefits to the
community; this belief (without more) is deemed sufficient to satisfy constitutional
public use requirements, thereby justifying the use of eminent domain powers.44   But
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45. According to Kelo: “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational,
our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings [or] . . . other kinds of
socioeconomic legislation are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”  Id. at 2667 (quoting Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
46. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.  It seems undeniable that the Kelo majority was captured
by a logic that began by finding a valid governmental undertaking (economic revitalization), and arguable
(albeit only problematic) public benefits that would derive from that revitalization.  It then reasons that
if this same analytic sequencing is applied to other settings where constitutional rights
(akin to the property rights in Kelo) are said to be protected, it is quickly apparent that
these rights are at risk (may be eviscerated or rendered a nullity) in the same manner
that the limitations in the Fifth Amendment’s “takings clause” have been rendered
meaningless by Kelo.  
For example, law enforcement is surely a public purpose; if New London, faced
with rising crime rates, undertook a widened program of search and electronic
surveillance, it could logically believe that this enhanced program of law enforcement
would have benefits to the community.  Citing the reasoning of Kelo, would not the
abrogation of traditional “probable cause” standards (standards that today protect
individual rights and civil liberties) be appropriate?  After all, the rationale of Kelo, put
simply, is that once a public purpose is found, the means to achieving the ends sought
are within the purview and prerogative of elected executive/legislative officials.45  In
the same vein, protecting young children from pornographic and/or salacious print
matter is surely a public purpose; if New London faced with a rising exposure of its
young people to these materials undertook a widened program of banning and/or
censoring such materials, it could logically believe that this enhanced program of
censorship would have benefits to the community.  Again, citing Kelo, would not the
abrogation of traditional “community based standards” defining pornography
(standards that today protect First Amendment free speech rights) be appropriate? 
After all, Kelo’s requirements are met—there is a public purpose, and a not-irrational
means to achieving the ends sought has been fashioned by executive and legislative
leaders.  The number of such examples could be expanded, but the point seems
adequately made: the back to front analytic reasoning of the Kelo majority (a dressed
up “ends” justify “means” argument) has broad and dangerous implications; if not
modified, the Court’s reasoning may well lead to the truncating of other
constitutionally protected rights by application of the same faculty logic that underlies
Kelo.  
    The simple fact is that not everything government undertakes to do, not even those
things such as economic revitalization that government arguably has a legal right to
undertake to do, (and which may well create some benefits) can then become the basis
for avoiding, evading, or eviscerating constitutional (First, Fourth, or Fifth
Amendment) limitations on governmental action(s).  Laudable “ends” do not justify
the use of any and all “means” to achieve those ends.  If the view that “ends” do justify
“means” ever gains wide acceptance, then all constitutionally protected rights are at
risk.  In sum, constitutional limitations are there for a purpose—they protect individual
liberties and/or private rights; and in a just and balanced society—“ends” do not
always justify “means.”  Unfortunately, the Kelo majority’s reasoning forgets these
basic truths.46
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these findings taken alone (and certainly taken together) constitute a valid public purpose.  See supra note
44. The majority then baldly asserts that its finding that public purpose requirements are met is the
functional equivalent of finding that the public use requirements of the Fifth Amendment are met.  The
majority’s language speaks for itself:  “Because that plan [New London’s economic development plan]
unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.  But the Kelo majority offers no
case law support (indeed there is none) for this logical leap.  Moreover, it is a dangerous leap—if economic
revitalization and proffered benefits (without more) is a public purpose, which in turn meets public use
requirements, then we sanction whatever exercise(s) of eminent domain the governing body feels is
necessary to effectuate the revitalization.
This aspect of the Court’s reasoning is made even more dangerous when coupled with the Court’s
over-broad approach to the concept of deference.  See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.  The
breadth of the Kelo Court’s capitulation to deference is shocking—it plucks from Berman the phrase: “Once
the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken . . . rests
in the discretion of the legislative branch.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).   And with this statement the Kelo majority avoids meaningful
review of the Fifth Amendment’s limitations; Berman’s language of deference is applied not just to the
executive/legislative plan implementing measures that the Berman Court was addressing, but to the
threshold constitutional question that the Kelo Court was being called upon to decide (and which ought to
have been decided on a far less deferential basis). 
47. Besides Justice Kennedy, the five member majority includes Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
48. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. at 2669.
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 2661. 
51. See id. at 2669.
52. Id. at 2670.
53. Id.
54. Id.
A.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy begins by joining the opinion of the Court; he thus becomes the
essential fifth vote permitting New London’s eminent domain taking of the Kelo
property.  But at the same time Justice Kennedy is more wary than his majority
colleagues.47  In settings such as those posed in Kelo, he would leave more room than
his majority colleagues for judicial examination of “a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties.”48  His examination begins “with the
presumption that the government’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a
public purpose.”49  This approach, though deferential to governmental decision making
is less deferential than Justice Steven’s approach, which would bar takings in Kelo-like
cases only in settings tantamount to fraud.50  
Justice Kennedy, proceeding through his more searching review of the
condemnations in Kelo, notes that New London’s depressed economic condition is
real—there is “evidence corroborating the validity of this concern.”51  He goes on to
note that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that [respondents] were motivated
by a desire to aid . . . particular private entities.”52  He finds that “the projected
economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimus.”53  And
finally, he is moved by the fact that “[t]he city complied with elaborate procedural
requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”54
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59. Id.
He concludes, “[i]n sum, while there may be categories of cases in which the transfers
are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported
benefits so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an impermissible private
purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case.”55
But while Justice Kennedy (to his credit) would take a harder look than his
majority colleagues at whether “public” or “private/pretextual” purposes are being
served in an economic revitalization program that involves the eminent domain taking
of property, he readily accepts the central error of the majority opinion: “that a taking
should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5., as
long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’”56  He then cites the
same cases cited by the majority opinion, Berman and Midkiff, failing to see the factual
differences (noted above) between these cases and Kelo, while at the same time
accepting the reverse logic—the “ends” justifying “means” approach of the majority
opinion.  
Justice Kennedy goes on to justify the highly deferential review of the majority as
akin to the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  He fails to see that economic regulation is a
type of executive/legislative policy making entitled to a high degree of judicial
deference, whereas (as noted above) constitutional limitations on executive/legislative
prerogative are entitled to much less deference.  Indeed, the meaning and scope of
these limitations, which in turn defines the meaning and scope of some underlying
constitutional right (here the private property right) is and always has been, a judicial
responsibility.57   In this respect Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, his over-
reliance on deference to executive/legislative judgment to define the public use
limitations in the Fifth Amendment, is as incorrect as was Steven’s majority opinion.
Finally, Justice Kennedy further demonstrates his wariness of the broad rule
fashioned by the majority opinion by expressing a willingness to explore a narrower
rule of law applicable to eminent domain takings arising out of economic development.
He begins this portion of his concurrence by agreeing with the majority opinion that
a per se rule barring the use of eminent domain in these settings is probably
inappropriate.  Nor is Justice Kennedy particularly supportive of a presumption of
invalidity in these settings, though he leaves the door somewhat open to this
approach.58  But having said this, he goes on to state that this “does not foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and
Midkiff  [and by extension Kelo] might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn
category of [eminent domain] takings.”59  Having whetted our appetite for a more
cautious, balanced approach to eminent domain takings, Justice Kennedy, nevertheless,
backs away from his own good idea; he states in the concluding paragraph of his
concurrence that “[t]his is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might
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61. The view that constitutionally predicated public use questions ought not to be avoided, ducked, or
finessed by the judicial branch is long standing.  Indeed, an impressive array of treatise and case law
citations suggest that such questions must ultimately be decided by the courts.  Two must suffice here.
Judge Cooley noted in A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations that: “The question what is a public use
is always one of law.  Deference will be paid to the legislative judgment, as expressed in enactments
providing for an appropriation of property, but it will not be conclusive.”  COOLEY, supra note 18 at 774-
75.  New Hampshire’s highest court in Concord Railroad v. Greely noted: 
The words [public use] are very comprehensive, and may include a multitude of objects.
Their construction is a matter for judicial decision; because, however decided may be the
opinion of the legislature that property in a given case has been taken for a public use, still,
whenever the question arises whether it has thus been taken, within the meaning of the
constitution, it becomes our duty to determine it.  The opinion of the legislature is not final
upon this.
17 N.H. 47, 56-57 (1845).    
justify a more demanding standard . . . .”60 That’s unfortunate; Kelo seemed to many
the ideal case, the perfect occasion to strike a better balance (than does Berman and
Midkiff) between private property rights and the exercise of eminent domain powers,
particularly when these interests are in conflict in economic revitalization settings.
One can only conjecture that in Kelo the polar views of the majority and the dissent
were not conducive to compromise.  Part II of this paper, however, takes up Justice
Kennedy’s suggestion, and in what is characterized as a Kelo-like case of the future,
explores the outline of a more limited use of eminent domain powers in economic
revitalization (and other similar) settings.
B.  Conclusions
As noted, both the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence fail to
appreciate the significant factual differences between Kelo and the principal cases upon
which Kelo purports to rely.  In each of these earlier cases (Berman, Midkiff,
Ruckelshaus, Old Dominion, and Welsh) there was either an independent justifiable
basis for the challenged use of eminent domain or there was no taking at all.  That is
not the case in Kelo.  In Kelo there is no direct, or even indirect, public use of the
condemned land, and no independent basis for the eminent domain taking of non-slum,
non-blighted private property.  The fact that economic revitalization may well be a
permissible governmental undertaking and that the land taken might facilitate these
revitalization efforts has never heretofore been deemed a sufficient basis for holding
that Fifth Amendment limitations on the use of eminent domain powers have been met.
In sum, the facts in these earlier cases are inapposite to those posed in Kelo; they
simply do not suggest, much less dictate the holding in Kelo.  On the contrary, the facts
in Kelo suggest an outcome that is exactly the opposite from that reached by the
majority.
With respect to “deference,” it seems clear that both the Kelo majority and the
Kennedy concurrence misunderstand the concept, and misread the prior case law they
cite.  The Kelo opinion fails to grasp that “deference” is a nuanced concept, that there
is something that might be called a “deference continuum.”  Judicial review of
executive/legislative actions hedged by constitutional limitations must be searching to
insure that constitutional rights and duties are protected.61  Very little deference should
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62. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (holding that
the reviewing court had the duty to take a “thorough, probing, in-depth review” to determine whether
explicit statutory requirements were complied with by the Secretary of Transportation in approving an
interstate highway right of way).  
63. That this is precisely what the Kelo majority has done was recognized by Judge Ryan in his dissent
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W. 455, 465 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J.
dissenting).  Ultimately, the Michigan Court embraced Judge Ryan’s earlier wisdom when it overruled
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).  Judge Ryan noted that
the Poletown majority gave “unwarranted judicial imprimatur upon governmental action taken under the
policy of the end justifying the means.”  Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
at 465.  Ryan went on to explain why he set out his views in such lengthy dissent; his parting justification
is as follows:
Finally, it seems important to describe in detail for the bench and bar who may address a
comparable issue on a similarly stormy day, how easily government, in all of its branches,
caught up in the frenzy of perceived economic crisis, can disregard the rights of the few in
allegiance to the always disastrous philosophy that the end justifies the means.
Id. (emphasis added).
be accorded executive/legislative judgments that are contrary to the intent and purpose
of these limitations.  When only federal and/or state statutory limitations hedge the
executive/legislative actions of a New London (and/or its instrument, the NLDC),
somewhat more, but still very little deference should be accorded the executive/
legislative judgment.62   In most instances, the statutory duty must be honored unless
or until it is repealed or modified.  Once constitutional and/or statutory limitations are
shown to have been met, or do not exist, then reviewing courts can (and should) extend
a much higher degree of deference to legislative policy choices, judgments, and plan
implementing strategies.  This higher degree of deference, however, cannot be used as
it was by the Kelo majority to finesse or circumvent the more searching (less
deferential) review that Fifth Amendment limitations on the use of eminent domain
powers should have been accorded.  Greater deference comes into play not before, but
only after a justifiable basis for the use of eminent domain has been found.  That is
what happened in all of the prior cases cited by the Kelo majority.  The failure of the
Kelo majority to recognize (and adhere) to these nuanced differences in the application
of the concept of deference was yet another factor that led to a holding that is exactly
the opposite from that which might reasonably have been anticipated.  
Finally, the analytic approach utilized by the Kelo majority (and Justice Kennedy)
is unprecedented and puts not only private property rights, but many other
constitutionally protected rights, at risk.  At its core their reasoning accepts the view
that if the “ends” are permissible (in this case economic revitalization), then the
“means” chosen by the legislature to accomplish those “ends” (in this case eminent
domain takings) are also permissible.63  This inverse approach to determining whether
constitutional limitations on the exercise of eminent domain powers have been met,
coupled with the over-broad application of deference principles noted above, a
deference that leads the Court to decline meaningful review of Fifth Amendment
limitations on legislative prerogative, has led to a holding that seems both erroneous
and unwise.
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64. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
65. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 752 (7th ed. 1903).
66. Id. at 756.
67. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894),  was an earlier
case that did not capture national attention nor hold our focus as Pennsylvania Coal did, but it stood for
a similar proposition, i.e., that regulations, if too extreme, would give rise to a taking.
68. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 413.
70. See Delogu, The Law of Taking Elsewhere and, One Suspects, In Maine, 52 ME. L. REV. 324
II.  AN UNFORTUNATE DICHOTOMY
A generation or more of first year law students in basic property law courses have
come to understand that private property is taken by governmental action in one of two
ways.  The first operates indirectly and without payment of compensation; it is
triggered by exercises of the police power that regulate the rights and duties of
property owners in order to protect the public’s health, safety, and general welfare.  As
one court put it: “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.  As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power.”64  The second means by which private property is
taken is by exercise of the power of eminent domain.  Here the taking is direct, “just
compensation” is paid, and fee simple (or lesser) interests in those parcels of land
thought to be essential to meeting public needs and/or to the carrying out of
governmental duties, are acquired.  The exercise of this power too is thought to be
essential, an inherent aspect of the concept of sovereignty.  Justice Cooley, a leading
constitutional scholar begins his discussion of eminent domain by noting that “[e]very
sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other property, which it holds for the use
of its officers and agents, to enable them to perform their public functions.”65  He goes
on: “Every species of property which the public needs may require and which
government cannot lawfully appropriate under any other right, is subject to be seized
and appropriated under the right of eminent domain.”66
There is no inherent difficulty or problem associated with the realities just
described, i.e., that private property interests may be appropriated to public use by
either one of two ways: by an exercise of the police power or by exercise of eminent
domain powers.  An unfortunate problem does arise, however, from the fact that only
one of these two broad tools (exercises of the police power) has been subject to careful
and expanding judicial scrutiny, whereas the other tool (exercises of eminent domain
powers) has received only a limited and declining level of judicial attention.  The
reality of this unfortunate dichotomy of approaches with respect to judicial review
seems irrefutable.  For more than eighty years, at least since Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,67 the highest level of our judicial system has recognized that “[t]he general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”68  Earlier the Pennsylvania Coal Court had
noted that “it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has
gone beyond its constitutional power.”69  Thus was born both the concept of a
“regulatory taking” and the legitimacy of judicial review (triggered by a private
property owner) to determine whether a particular regulation has “gone too far.”70
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(2000), particularly notes 2, 13, and 19 which contain citations to other books and articles addressing
regulatory taking issues.  
71. A spate of recent Supreme Court cases has fleshed out our regulatory takings jurisprudence in any
number of ways. See Delogu, supra note 70, at 324-25 n.4, which lists eight recent cases.  Since that article
was published, the Supreme Court has handed down Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)
(sustaining plaintiff’s contention that a taking claim may be brought even though title was acquired after
regulations were in place, and that the case was ripe for review, but remanding the case to Rhode Island’s
courts to determine whether a regulatory taking, under the guidelines of Penn Central, had occurred);
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (rejecting
plaintiff’s contention that a lengthy moratorium constituted a per se taking, but again remanding the case
to lower courts to determine whether a regulatory taking under the guidelines of Penn Central had
occurred).  A similar line of case law can be found in every state; in Maine, for example, see Seven Islands
Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982) (sustaining timber
harvesting regulations in designated deer yard areas challenged as a taking—the value of timber that could
not be harvested was de minimus); Hall v. Board of Environmental Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987)
(sustaining regulations that limited building in coastal sand dune areas challenged as a taking—the
developer could realize reasonable economic returns); MC Associates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2001 ME
89, 773 A.2d 439 (sustaining the town’s wetlands ordinance challenged as a taking because the applicant
did not adequately show that the lot was buildable or that the diminution in value constituted a taking). 
72. Two cases cited by the Kelo Court (see Kelo v. City of New London 125 Sup. Ct. at 2661),
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), might
have served this purpose—they each contain terse language that shores up the common understanding of
private property rights in the society and the meaning of constitutional limitations designed to guard these
rights. For example, the Missouri Pacific Court concludes by noting that “[t]he taking by a State of the
private property of one person or corporation, without the owner’s consent, for the private use of another,
is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution.”
Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Neb., 164 U.S. at 417.  But, unlike Pennsylvania Coal in the area of regulatory takings,
our jurisprudence has not elevated either of these cases (or any other case) to be the balance wheel of
competing public and private interests in the context of eminent domain takings; and the Kelo Court
without overruling these cases, or acknowledging that the literal language of these cases has been softened
to accommodate some essential private uses growing out of eminent domain takings, simply dismisses these
two cases as “impractical.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2662; supra note 19.  The Kelo
majority’s reasoning then moves on to its “deference” and “benefit” theories, which, as noted, simply
eliminate the Fifth Amendment’s limitations on the use of eminent domain—there is not even a bow to the
utility or justice of balancing competing public and private interests in condemnation settings.
From that day to the present every state court system, and the federal courts, have been
willing to subject challenged regulations to a level of judicial scrutiny that not only
determines whether a “regulatory taking” has occurred in the particular instance, but
by the very existence of the process serves to limit misuse of police power regulatory
tools.  We are the better for it.71  
But no similar case, no eighty-year old landmark (analogous to Pennsylvania
Coal) stands as a guardian of private property rights that are threatened by exercises
of eminent domain power that have “gone too far.”72  It is this dichotomy—that one
strand of our takings jurisprudence is subject to intense and ongoing judicial review
by both federal and state courts, while the other is subject to little or no judicial
scrutiny, and will receive even less judicial attention as a result of the Kelo holding,
that is unfortunate.  More than unfortunate, the Kelo holding (in the name of deference
to legislative judgments) seems to mark a retreat by the federal courts from traditional
judicial review functions—a retreat from the Supreme Court’s duty to shore up and be
the guardian of constitutional limitations on legislative prerogative.  This abdication
in the context of Kelo is seen by many as a threat to long and widely held views as to
2006]       KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON—A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 37
73. The fears engendered by Kelo are not new; Maine courts, over 130 years ago, had occasion to
address a series of somewhat different but similar threats to private property rights protected by
constitutional limitations on legislative power that parallel the Fifth Amendment limitations examined in
Kelo.  In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872) (striking down a proposal to grant tax exemptions
and lend taxpayer monies to induce industrial development in the town), the court concluded by noting that:
The constitution of the State is its paramount and binding law.  The acquisition, possession,
and protection of property are among the chief ends of government.  To take directly or
indirectly the property of individuals to loan to others for purposes of private gain and
speculation against the consent of those whose money is thus loaned, would be to withdraw
it from the protection of the constitution and submit it to the will of an irresponsible
majority.  It would be the robbery and spoliation of those whose estates, in whole or in part
are thus confiscated.  No surer or more effectual method could be devised to deter from
accumulation—to diminish capital, to render property insecure, and thus to paralyze
industry.  
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
One year earlier, Maine’s highest court was asked by the Maine Legislature to render an advisory
opinion as to whether “the legislature [has] authority under the constitution to pass laws enabling towns,
by gifts of money . . . to assist individuals or corporations to establish or carry on manufacturing . . . .”  In
Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 590 (1871), the court answered NO; the court summarized its views
as follows:
To give the power suggested would be to enable the majority, according to their own will
and pleasure, to give, lend, and invest the capital of others . . . .  Let this be done, and the
remaining rights of property would be hardly worth the preserving . . . .  [T]o take private
property, not for public but for private uses, . . . [is] to undermine the very foundations upon
which all good governments rest.  
Id. at 598 (emphasis added).  Cf.  Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants of Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (1873) (striking
down non-uniform property taxation designed to benefit a particular firm as a violation of constitutional
limitations).
74. It is no answer for the Kelo Court to invite individual states to put in place more stringent
limitations on the exercise of eminent domain powers, see supra note 2;  the states have always had this
power and some states have exercised it—perhaps more will do so in the wake of Kelo.  But this line of
reasoning misses the point—the Fifth Amendment’s protections and limitations are part of the Federal
Constitution.  It is this document, guarded by a Supreme Court with judicial review powers and
responsibilities that cannot be abdicated, that was historically seen as the bulwark, the vehicle for protecting
the private property rights of all citizens without regard to the state they happened to live in.  As recent
Supreme Court cases attest, see Delogu, supra notes 70-71, the protections afforded property owners faced
with “regulatory takings” are not subject to the vagaries of state law—the Supreme Court has fashioned
(and continues to fashion) a reasonable balance between the rights of property and the scope of police
power controls.  Sooner or later, Kelo notwithstanding, a similar balance must be struck by the Supreme
Court between the rights of property and exercises of eminent domain powers.  In short, it cannot be
maintained that because the individual states can correct the problem (in whole or in part), the Supreme
Court is free to abdicate its judicial review responsibilities with respect to eminent domain takings.  This
reasoning is all the more untenable given the fact that the Supreme Court has abdicated nothing in the area
of “regulatory takings”—indeed it maintains a health vigil over the latter.
the sanctity and compass of private property rights.  The firestorm of protest of Kelo
and the breadth of remedial legislative proposals to narrow the Court’s holding attests
to the reality, and the deep seated nature of the fears aroused by Kelo.73  Sooner or
later, these fears must be addressed, not just by the legislative arms of government, but
by the Supreme Court itself.74  An appropriate step for the Court to take would be to
bridge, and once and for all end, the dichotomy between judicial responses to
regulatory takings and judicial responses to eminent domain takings that now exists.
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75. See supra note 17.
76. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  See also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 n.22
(2005).
77. See text accompanying note 64.
78. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
79. Id.
80. Id. 
This paper would offer some modest suggestions with respect to the shape and content
of this bridging case.  
A.  A Missed Opportunity
Obviously, the opportunity for the Kelo case itself to become the bridging vehicle,
the case that ends the dichotomy of approach that exists in our takings jurisprudence,
has passed.  Many who had followed this case and this area of law had high hopes that
Kelo would be the Pennsylvania Coal of eminent domain takings law.  This hope was
whetted by the timing of events—the Michigan court repudiated Poletown and its
controversial rationale (that General Motor’s proposed economic revitalization,
without more, justified the use of eminent domain)75 after the Connecticut court’s
decision in Kelo, but well before the Supreme Court was likely to hand down its
decision in the case; this seemed a good omen.  If Michigan’s highest court could
reexamine and reject its own prior reasoning, then why couldn’t/shouldn’t the Supreme
Court reexamine these issues anew (and put Berman and Midkiff in a more balanced
posture)?  But that didn’t happen—with barely a footnote reference, and without
discussing or distinguishing the rationale of the case that overruled Poletown, County
of Wayne v. Hathcock,76 the Kelo majority not only embraces the reasoning that
Michigan had rejected, but does so in a manner that all but eliminates the Fifth
Amendment’s protections of private property in eminent domain settings. 
What is most striking and inexplicable about the Kelo holding is the majority’s
failure to recognize the fundamental differences in reasoning between Kelo and
Pennsylvania Coal (a case which remains good law today and is frequently cited by
the Supreme Court).  For example, immediately after the Pennsylvania Coal passage
cited above (“[g]overnment hardly could go on, etc . . . .”77)—a passage which
recognized that reasonable, albeit uncompensated, diminutions of property rights were
necessary and that property rights can be limited by reasonable regulation and “must
yield to the police power,”78—the Pennsylvania Coal Court went on to recognize that
any limit on property rights must itself  “have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone.”79  In other words laudable end results sought by police power
controls could not be viewed as absolute or without limit; the legislative judgment was
entitled to deference, but could not be seen as inviolate; a balance between private
property rights and legislatively fashioned police power controls must be struck.
Striking this balance, determining whether “the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power,”80 was the duty of the court(s).  More importantly, the
Pennsylvania Coal Court saw clearly that failing to strike this balance would nullify
constitutional limitations designed to protect private property rights.  It was not
prepared to let this happen.   
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81. Id.
82. Id. at 415.
83. See id. at 416.
84. Id. at 415. 
85. Id. at 416.
86. Id. at 413.
In Kelo, on the other hand, there are no parallel lines of reasoning, e.g., that
property rights are held subject to exercise of eminent domain powers (a point that all
would readily concede); but that exercise of the latter power must itself, “have its
limits, or the [Fifth Amendment’s protections of private property] are gone.”81  Instead,
the Kelo majority begins by finding a laudable end, i.e., economic revitalization
(analogous to the police power regulation in Pennsylvania Coal).  But unlike the
Pennsylvania Coal Court, the Kelo majority regards the legislative judgment that this
end can only be achieved by the exercise of eminent domain powers as inviolate;
bowing to an over-broad concept of deference, it finds no meaningful judicial role; it
strikes no meaningful balance between private property rights and governmental
exercise of its eminent domain powers; it does not ask whether government in this
instance has gone “too far.”82  In so reasoning, the Kelo holding does precisely what
the reasoning and holding of Pennsylvania Coal avoided—it eviscerates constitutional
limitations designed to protect private property.   
Another example of fundamentally different reasoning between Kelo and
Pennsylvania Coal is seen in how they approach (characterize) the possibility of
governmental excess and/or errors in judgment.  The Pennsylvania Coal Court fully
recognized that those exercising the police power may allow their human nature to run
away with them; they may be caught up in an excess of zeal, or simply err as to where
(in a particular setting) the balance between police power controls and private property
should be struck.  This non-judgmental recognition of the possibility of error by
government officials is noted at several points: “[w]e assume, of course, that the statute
was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it . . . .
But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.”83
The Court further noted: 
When this seemingly absolute protection [of private property] is found to be qualified
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.  But that cannot
be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.84 
 Another oft-quoted passage makes the same point, i.e., that earnest desire may cloud
judgment and may give rise to impermissible regulation; rising to the level of a
“regulatory” taking that (if the underlying issue is thought to be important enough) can
only be sustained by an exercise of government’s spending powers: “We are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change.”85  And again, determining whether “desire” or “human nature” had
outrun the bounds of reasonable regulation was, under Pennsylvania Coal, the task of
the courts; interested parties were free to “contend that the legislature had gone beyond
its constitutional power,”86 but it was the courts, in the course of carrying out a
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87. Id. at 415. 
88. Id. at 416. 
89. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. 
90. Indeed, it must be recognized that Pennsylvania Coal (not Kelo) is the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in every setting in which constitutionally protected private rights and/or interests are in
conflict with some valid governmental interest. For example, a rich and lengthy body of case law has
carefully balanced a limited range of time, place, and other restraints on otherwise unfettered First
Amendment free speech rights.  See, e.g., Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Inc., 467 U.S. 947,
970 (1984) (striking down as overly broad a state statute that limited the solicitation of contributions by
a charitable organization); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992)
meaningful judicial review, that would finally determine whether a particular exercise
of governmental regulatory power had gone “too far.”
In sharp contrast, Kelo does not acknowledge the possibility of governmental error
in the exercise of eminent domain powers—error arising out of having gone “too far,”
or stemming from “the natural tendency of human nature”87 to extend the power being
exercised to a point where it swallows constitutional limitations on the use of that
power, or from an excess of “desire to improve the public condition . . . .”88  Instead,
in what amounts to little more than a fraud standard, Kelo states the obvious:
condemning A’s land for the sole purpose of conferring a private benefit on a
particular private party, B, is forbidden; also forbidden is the taking of “property under
the mere pretext of a public purpose . . . .”89  Under Kelo, that’s all that remains of the
Fifth Amendment’s limitations on the exercise of eminent domain powers.  
Kelo begins with the majority finding a public purpose (economic revitalization),
and ends by exercising a deference that regards all other legislative judgments (except
for the fraud settings noted above) as inviolate—not subject to judicial review.  Kelo’s
crabbed reasoning has fashioned a new reality in which no meaningful judicial role
remains; no meaningful balance between private property rights and the exercise of
eminent domain powers is capable of being struck.  In short, Kelo’s reasoning, by
failing to acknowledge even the possibility that errors of the type noted in
Pennsylvania Coal will occur, much less that such errors when they do arise in eminent
domain contexts will be redressed by the courts, has once again managed to do what
Pennsylvania Coal avoided doing; it strips away constitutional protections intended
to protect private property.
The point being made is that the two strands of our takings jurisprudence, so-
called regulatory takings on one hand, and eminent domain takings on the other, are
being dealt with in quite different ways.  More importantly, it seems clear that the
approach and reasoning of Pennsylvania Coal, established in the context of a challenge
to police power regulation and adhered to for over eighty years in thousands of cases
handed down in state and federal courts in every state in the nation, is more realistic,
more pragmatic, and more faithful to fundamental principles that operate in society
than is Kelo.  It is Pennsylvania Coal, not Kelo, that recognizes that property rights
(though not absolute) are entitled to stability, protection, and respect; it is
Pennsylvania Coal that recognizes that constitutional limitations must count for
something—they cannot be rendered a nullity; it is Pennsylvania Coal that refuses to
abdicate fundamental (constitutionally predicated) judicial responsibilities, i.e., to
fashion, one case at a time, a framework of law that fairly balances private property
rights on one hand and legitimate public interests on the other.90  Kelo, set in the
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(sustaining regulations which prohibited the distribution of literature and solicitation of funds in airport
terminal facilities); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (sustaining in part and
striking down in part injunctions that limited the free speech rights of those who oppose abortion from
exercising their rights in too close proximity to a clinic providing abortion services).  In the Second
Amendment area of gun ownership, a limited range of restraints designed to protect the safety of police
officers and the public, and to keep guns out of the hands of those demonstrably unsuited to exercise the
right of gun ownership, have been sustained, but only after carefully balancing these interests against the
protected right of gun ownership.  See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216, 225 (1976)
(sustaining provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 which barred ownership of a weapon by a convicted
felon); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (striking down on Commerce Clause grounds the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990).  And again, in the area of Fourth Amendment safeguards against
unwarranted searches, an extensive body of case law has emerged that has balanced and re-balanced
governmental interests, often very legitimate law enforcement interests, against these privacy rights.  See,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protecting the privacy rights of individuals against unreasonable
and unwarranted searches); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (reiterating the principle that
Fourth Amendment cases involve a balancing of all relevant factors, the Court sustained a search incident
to a valid traffic stop).  
The point being made is that in all of these areas of interface between constitutionally protected
interests and governmental interests, the approach taken by Pennsylvania Coal is the norm.  The Kelo
approach that all but negates the constitutional protection, that fails to recognize that well-intentioned
government officials may nonetheless overreach, that affords near absolute deference to the governmental
interest and governmental decision making, that fails to draw prudential lines enabling a balance between
the competing interests to be struck, has been rejected, rejected because it is unsound, rejected because, as
the court in Mapp noted: “It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.” 367 U.S. at 647 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886)).  For these reasons, if for no other, the reasoning of the Kelo majority must be revisited
in a Kelo-like case of the future, a case that will do for eminent domain takings what Pennsylvania Coal
has done for regulatory takings. 
context of a challenged eminent domain taking of property, could have been a parallel
case to Pennsylvania Coal protecting the same broad values just noted, and
harmonizing our jurisprudence as applied to these two strands of takings law.  This
harmonization would serve us well; it seems long overdue.  That it has not yet
happened can only be described as unfortunate—an unfortunate result arising from a
combination of factors, not the least of which is the Kelo Court’s failure to recognize
that its reasoning and approach are out of sync not only with the cases it purports to
rely on, but with Pennsylvania Coal, (the leading regulatory taking case decided by the
Supreme Court, and certainly one of the most widely cited cases in Supreme Court
history).
But the issues that gave rise to the opportunity that Kelo represented will not go
away.  There will be another case, another Supreme Court that hopefully will see the
dichotomy in our approach to judicial review in regulatory, as opposed to eminent
domain, takings cases that needs to be bridged. In short, there will be another
opportunity to strike the balances that Kelo failed to strike.  It seems useful at this point
to lay out some of characteristics and lines of reasoning that this future Kelo-like case
can and should embrace. 
B.  A Future Kelo-like Case 
It should be stated at the outset that a future Kelo-like case can and should leave
intact a full, meaningful, and robust power of eminent domain.  What is sought is not
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a truncating of the power of eminent domain, but an assurance that the power will be
used reasonably.  In the same way that the regulatory powers of government are
essential, so too is the power of eminent domain.  But in the same way that
Pennsylvania Coal required regulatory powers to be used reasonably, lest they give
rise to a “regulatory taking,” a future Kelo-like case must insist that eminent domain
powers be exercised reasonably, that they be exercised in a manner that gives full
meaning to existing and long-standing constitutional limitations, in a manner that
balances private property rights on one hand and the legitimate needs of government
on the other.   
Nor does it seem particularly necessary or useful in a future Kelo case to embrace
any type of per se rule.  Per se rules assume a predictable and fixed set of conditions
and factors that are unlikely to be found in settings calling for the use of eminent
domain powers.  Moreover, they introduce a rigidity that on occasion we will almost
certainly want to circumvent.  The shape of a future Kelo case, a case that does for
eminent domain takings what Pennsylvania Coal did for regulatory takings, should rely
on more general (more flexible) principles that define “public use” and “just
compensation,” not per se rules that invite a search for exceptions and/or that become
less appropriate as time passes.  
It would also seem useful if a future Kelo-like case began by acknowledging the
unfortunate dichotomy between the level of judicial scrutiny afforded regulatory
takings and the level of scrutiny in eminent domain cases.  Also important would be
a commitment to bridging and thereby ending this dichotomy of approach by taking up
Justice Kennedy’s invitation to fashion a more stringent standard of review for eminent
domain takings than that announced in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo.  A future Kelo-like
case can and should be cast even more broadly than Justice Kennedy suggests; it
should encompass not only eminent domain takings growing out of economic
revitalization programs, but eminent domain takings where the property owner makes
a plausible argument that the blight/slum removal or the public use justification for the
taking is pretextual, or does not strike a fair balance between the private property right
and the asserted governmental interest.  
In other words, if the dichotomy of approach in our takings jurisprudence is to be
fully bridged, a wide range of eminent domain takings, not just those arising in the
context of economic revitalization, must be subject to a type of judicial review that
parallels the review afforded property owners faced with a regulatory taking; a review
that parallels Pennsylvania Coal; a review that confesses the possibility of
governmental error (going “too far”); a review that strikes reasonable balances between
property rights on one hand and eminent domain powers on the other; a review that
does not, in the name of deference, render Fifth Amendment (“public use”) limitations
all but meaningless.  In addition, a future Kelo-like case must not fall into the trap that
the Kelo majority fell into—laudable “ends” (economic revitalization) do not justify
the use of any “means” to achieve those “ends.”  Finding a “public purpose” must not
be seen as the same thing as finding that constitutional “public use” limitations have
been met.  
To facilitate the type of judicial review of eminent domain takings being
suggested, at least in those cases where Justice Kennedy’s standard of a “plausible
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91. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2669.
92. 512 U.S. 374, 391, 395 (1994) (imposing a proportionality requirement on government exactions
imposed in the course of regulating development, and shifting the burden of justifying exactions that call
for relinquishing a property right onto the governmental entity). 
93. Id. at 395.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
95. The distinction between “public use” that would justify an eminent domain taking, and “public
benefit” that all lawful businesses give rise to (which do not justify a taking of private property) was fully
understood over a century ago.  See Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877) (striking down a statute that
granted mill dam owners a power of eminent domain; public use requirements were not met).  This
distinction was clearly and exhaustively laid out by Justice Ryan in his original dissent in the Poletown
case.  Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 472-75 (Mich. 1981).  Judge
Ryan’s dissent is now embraced (and further elaborated) by the full Michigan court in its over-ruling of
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  In County of Wayne, note
particularly Justice Young’s majority opinion at 779-83.  See also supra notes 17 and 18. 
96. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.  See also, supra note 19.
97. Judge Ryan’s dissent in the Poletown case, see supra note 95, gives us any number of examples
of how Michigan (and other states) have proceeded.  Ryan begins by acknowledging: “It is plain, of course,
that condemnation of property for transfer to private corporations is not wholly proscribed.”  Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d at 476.  He then turns to a range of public/private
undertakings—highways, railroads, canals—he might have added, public utility rights-of-way (all of which
are often privately owned), where the use of eminent domain powers has long been sanctioned because the
facilities serve commerce and the general public, and without the power to condemn land they almost
certainly could not exist, could not overcome the “holdout” problem.  Judge Ryan next cites a half-dozen
accusation”91 of the impermissibility of the taking is presented, our future Kelo-like
case should shift the burden of justifying the proposed condemnation onto the
governmental entity proposing use of this power.  This is the same approach that was
taken by the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard 92 when regulatory exactions
(requirements that a property owner relinquish title to a portion of his property) were
struck down because “the city ha[d] not met its burden of demonstrating that the
additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner’s development
reasonably relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway easement.”93  Embracing this approach in settings where condemnations are
justifiably challenged would put eminent domain takings and regulatory takings on the
same footing.
Beyond these seemingly essential characteristics and lines of reasoning that a
future Kelo-like case should embrace, a future case would do well to recognize that the
Fifth Amendment’s language is both explicit and narrower than the concepts of
“public purpose” and/or “public benefit.”  The Constitution says: “nor shall private
property be taken for public use . . . .”94  It is “public use” then, that must be found as
a justification for exercising the awesome power of eminent domain, as a justification
for ousting one of his or her property right, not some broader, looser concept (public
purpose or public benefit) that trivializes both property rights and the Fifth Amend-
ment’s limitations.95  Justice Steven’s assertion that the concept of “public use” is
“impractical” and “difficult to administer”96 is simply not borne out by the facts.  It has
been administered by state courts in almost every jurisdiction for over a century in a
way that has avoided its narrowest, and a too literal, interpretation, but which at the
same time has avoided an overly broad public purpose/benefit interpretation that would
make the Fifth Amendment’s limitations almost meaningless.97  A Supreme Court
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cases in and out of Michigan reaching back to the mid-1850's to support his point.  Id.  He discusses the
slum clearance cases in his expanded (but still limited) range of settings in which condemnation followed
by private ownership is permissible.  Citing In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951), Judge
Ryan notes: “It seems to us that the public purpose of slum clearance is in any event the one controlling
purpose of the condemnation . . . resale . . . is not a primary purpose and is incidental and ancillary to the
primary and real purpose of clearance . . . [which was] to remove slums for reasons of the health, morals,
safety, and welfare of the whole community.”  Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d at 477.   
98. 684 N.W.2d 765, 781-83 (Mich. 2004).
99. Id. at 781.
100. Id. at 782.
101. Id. at 783.
102. These provisions, see e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 30-A § 5204 (1996),  are designed to operate
in settings where the power to take a particular property is clear; presumably the only issue to be
determined, with respect to which there may be disagreement, is the level of compensation.  What is “just”
in the particular setting?  A further presumption of such statutory provisions is that judicial proceedings
can, and ultimately will, arrive at a figure that will then be paid over to the condemnee.  In the interim,
however, title is vested in the condemnor; the project which necessitated the condemnation will not be
delayed. In settings where the power to take is not clear, however, where plausible “public use” arguments
are sought to be raised by the private property owner, the operation of such statutes may be very unfair.
The governmental entity that initiated the condemnation (anticipating that its right to do so will be
sustained) may undertake to clear the property before the permissibility of its actions are finally determined.
The property owner’s ability in such situations to obtain injunctive relief to maintain a pre-existing status
quo is at best problematic.  Without such relief, a condemnee whose land has been cleared, but who
dealing with a future Kelo-like case is fully capable of fashioning a similarly nuanced
(and practical) approach to the concept of  “public use.”  In doing so, the Court would
do well to keep in mind those factors (conditions/circumstances) that have moved
constitutional scholars and state courts in those settings where condemnation followed
by private ownership has been allowed.  The primary factors, stated most recently in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock,98 include situations where “public necessity of the
extreme sort . . .”99 is present.  The second factor noted is where “the private entity
remains accountable to the public in its use of that property.”100  The third factor noted
is where “the selection of the land to be condemned is . . . based on . . . facts of
independent public significance.”101  In other words, where the land condemnation is
driven by the realities of slum clearance as in Berman, not the needs of General
Motors, as it was in the Poletown case, or by the aspirational economic revitalization
plans of the Pfizer Corporation and/or of the New London Development Corporation
as it was in Kelo.  
Finally, a future Kelo-like case, should also focus on the “just compensation”
aspect of the Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain taking limitations, and might well
include some, or all, or an even broader range of individually small adjustments
(beyond those suggested in this paper) to our usual approach in the exercise of eminent
domain powers.  Many, if not all, of these adjustments seem particularly appropriate
in settings where the condemned land, for whatever reason, is ultimately conveyed to
other private individuals or corporate entities, and/or where Justice Kennedy’s
“plausible accusation” standard is met (a standard that suggests there are reasonable
arguments that the condemnation is impermissible).  In such settings, for example, the
so-called “quick take” provisions of a federal, state, or local government’s
condemnation powers might very well be deemed inapplicable.102  A second step
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ultimately prevails on the merits obtains nothing more than a pyrrhic victory.  In short, in settings such as
those laid out in the text, until a determination is made that a questioned eminent domain taking is in fact
permissible, preventing the use of these (“quick take”) statutes, and/or the automatic granting of injunctions
to maintain a pre-existing status-quo seems to strike a fair balance between private property rights and
governmental eminent domain powers.  See also William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use
in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, MICH. ST. L. REV. 929,
951 (2004); Gregory G. Schwab, The Maryland Survey 2001-2002: Recent Decisions: The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, 62 MD. L. REV. 840, 847-48 (2003); Christopher A. Bauer, Comment, Government
Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, BYU
L. REV. 265, 286-87 (2003).
103. This idea in various forms has been recognized and/or advanced by others.  See Fischel, supra note
102, at 950-51.  A section of Fischel’s article is pointedly entitled, “Why not Enhanced Compensation in
Doubtful Cases?”  Id. at 950.  He goes on to note that: “An alternative to heightened scrutiny for the
enterprise-use of eminent domain is to insist on a higher level of compensation in these cases.  This would
have the simultaneous benefits of making recipients less unhappy with having to relocate and making the
government agency think harder about whether the project was such a good idea.”  Id.  More recently, in
a National Law Journal/University of Chicago roundtable that examined Poletown and Kelo, Richard
Epstein noted that “every single bias in the compensation system leads to undercompensation.”  Debating
Eminent Domain, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 6, 2004, at 15.  In other words, our concept of “just compensation” is
less than “just.”  He called for compensation that is  “50% over market . . . .”  Id. at 14-15.  On the issue
of how “just” is our present system for fashioning “just compensation,” see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).  See particularly chapter 13 wherein he notes:
“The central difficulty of the market value formula for . . . compensation . . . is that it denies any
compensation for real but subjective values.”  Id. at 183. See also Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight:
Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 765 (1973).
104. The choice as to whether the granting governmental entity should create a fee simple determinable,
or a fee subject to a condition subsequent (and a description of the differences between these two types of
defeasible estates) is beyond the scope of this paper; the matter seems best decided when the facts of a
particular transfer, and the property laws of the jurisdiction (including the jurisdiction’s approach to the
Rule Against Perpetuities) are known.
(adjustment) that could be undertaken in these settings would set the “just
compensation” level at 125-150 percent of the average condemnor/condemnee
appraised market values.  This would compensate the condemnee for many of the
intangible values and costs (goodwill, the value inherent in an existing neighborhood,
a variety of relocation costs, etc.) not usually covered within the concept of “just
compensation” as it is traditionally applied.  In other words, even in settings where we
permissibly take A’s private property and it winds up in private entity B’s hands, we
could soften the bad taste that this leaves by more generously (some would say more
realistically) fashioning our concept of “just compensation.”103
When property held by the government (whether acquired by eminent domain or
by any other means) is transferred to a private individual or corporate entity pursuant
to an economic revitalization plan or to carry out any other defined industrial
development project, a third adjustment that seems particularly useful would effectuate
the transfer by creating what property lawyers call a “defeasible estate.”104  This
approach allows government to recapture the property (subject to the limits imposed
by the Rule Against Perpetuities) for public use and/or benefit in the event a grantee
either abandons, prematurely closes, significantly alters, or fails to deliver on promises
made with respect to the plan or project—promises that both induce and justify the
government’s land transfer.  It must be remembered that the land transfer is made to
facilitate the private project, plant, or scheme of economic revitalization; if this doesn’t
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105. In the Poletown case, for example, the City of Detroit assembled and transferred 465 acres of
densely settled urban land that was subsequently cleared to facilitate the building of a General Motors’
assembly plant.  GM, however, never realized either the employment levels, or the satellite plant
development that it promised to the City.  See Corsetti, Poletown Revisited, Counter Punch (weekend ed.
Sept. 18/19, 2004).  If, and when, this plant is closed and GM looks to sell or lease some or all of the plant
site and/or the buildings on the site, the recapture provision suggested should be triggered.  Failed economic
revitalization schemes should not accrue benefits to the private entity that obtained the condemned land;
these benefits belong to the public, to the governmental entity that initially condemned the land.
106. “Nominal price” could be defined as the original sale price, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index,
or current market value, whichever is lower.
107. 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (sustaining a condemnation for an irrigation ditch in language that associated
public use with public purpose).  But Justice Thomas in his Kelo dissent quite correctly points out that the
language was dictum; the reality was that the law underlying the irrigation project provided that “[a]ll
happen, the assembled parcel, any appreciated value, long-term future use oppor-
tunities, etc., should all revert to the government; they should not accrue as a windfall
to the defaulting grantee.105  Alternatively, a carefully conditioned long-term lease of
the property (instead of a transfer in fee) could be fashioned; or the transferring
governmental entity could reserve a right of first refusal (at a nominal price)106 should
the grantee, at a later date, seek to sell the transferred property.  Again, the purpose
here is to protect as fully as possible the long-term interests of the government with
respect to transferred land, not the interests of a defaulting private grantee.
Two last, relatively minor, adjustments in the use of eminent domain in settings
where the economic revitalization requires the transfer of A’s property to B, include
first, defining the time frame within which the grantee must commence utilization of
the property; something on the order of three to five years would seem appropriate.
Anything longer suggests that the revitalization scheme is problematic at best,
speculative at worst, and in either case, does not justify the condemnation of A’s
private property.  Second, a further step that could be taken would enable (whenever
possible) those whose land was purchased or condemned to facilitate revitalization to
have the option of relocating back to the project site or revitalized area.  Obviously,
if homes are condemned and an office block or factory is put in place, this is not
possible.  But when revitalization schemes (as in Kelo) contemplate a range of mixed
uses, there may well be some homeowners and small businesses that would welcome
the opportunity to return to the revitalized area.  This option should be available and
could even be provided at below market rates as a quid pro quo, particularly for those
who are forced to relocate by government condemnation.
C. Conclusions
The fact that our takings jurisprudence has two quite separate strands—so-called
“regulatory” takings and “eminent domain” takings seems self-evident; it also seems
beyond debate that the “regulatory” taking strand, at least since Pennsylvania Coal, has
been subject to continuous judicial scrutiny (in both state and federal courts) that has
sought to strike reasonable balances between private property rights on one hand and
legitimate police power controls on the other—to answer, and give meaning to the
ubiquitous question—when does a regulation go “too far.”  At the same time the
“eminent domain” strand of our takings jurisprudence has succumbed to a line of
reasoning said to begin with Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,107 but more
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landowners in the district have the right to a proportionate share of the water.”  Kelo v. City of New
London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2683 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. at 162).  Thus, in Fallbrook there was an actual meeting of the “public use” requirement
which the Fifth Amendment imposes.  Id. 
108. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).  The timing of these events could hardly be more ironic.  The Kelo
majority (implicitly, if not explicitly) embraces fully the rationale of Poletown less than a year after
Michigan’s highest court (the original authors of Poletown) rejected it completely.  With Justice Cooley’s,
Justice Ryan’s, and Justice Young’s logic staring them in the face, one had reason to hope for more from
the Kelo majority.
109. Id. at 786.
recently derives from Berman, Midkiff, and now Kelo, that imposes a shrinking level
of judicial review on challenged “eminent domain” takings by elevating the principle
of “deference” to legislative judgment to a point where it becomes an insurmountable
barrier to meaningful review, by equating public benefit and/or public purpose, with
public use, and by adopting an analytic approach that accepts the view that the “ends”
justify the “means.”  The net result is that in eminent domain settings no balance is
struck between private property rights on one hand and the exercise of condemnation
powers on the other.  The exercise of eminent domain powers by any governmental
entity is all but unassailable—the Fifth Amendment’s protections (of private property)
and limitations (on governmental power) are eviscerated.
Kelo was a case where the unfortunate consequences of this dichotomy of
approach between the two strands of our takings jurisprudence could have been
ameliorated, at least to some degree.  It was a case which lent itself to the fashioning
of prudential (more balanced) lines of analysis and reasoning in settings where the use
of eminent domain is challenged—analysis and reasoning akin to that fashioned by
Pennsylvania Coal in settings where a “regulatory taking” is said to have occurred. 
But, obviously, this did not happen.  
Kelo is now a part of the fabric of “eminent domain” takings law—it is part of the
problem.  At the same time its flawed reasoning, its very excess, the threat it poses to
long-standing concepts of private property has reverberated throughout the land.  As
noted at the outset, the end of these reverberations is not yet in sight.  Nowhere have
the flaws, the excess, and the threats to private property been more succinctly stated
than by Michigan’s highest court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock (the case that
overruled Poletown).108  Judge Young, speaking for a unanimous court, noted:
Poletown’s [and Kelo’s] “economic benefit” rationale would validate practically any
exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.  After all, if
one’s ownership of private property is forever subject to the government’s
determination that another private party would put one’s land to a better use, then the
ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of any
large discount retailer, “megastore,” or the like.  Indeed, it is for precisely this reason
that this Court has approved the transfer of condemned property to private entities
only when certain other conditions—those identified in . . . Justice Ryan’s Poletown
dissent—are present.109
In sum, the flawed reasoning, the excess, the threat to private property that Kelo
represents will almost certainly produce a series of legislative corrections in any
number of states, perhaps even at the federal level.  There will also be another case—a
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future Kelo-like case that will be heard by a different Supreme Court, hopefully by a
Court prepared to find that an exercise of eminent domain power may go “too far” in
the same sense that regulation may go “too far”—a Court prepared to strike a better,
a more fair, and more reasoned balance between the rights of private property on one
hand and the power of eminent domain on the other.  For the well-being of the nation,
one hopes that such a case and such a Court will meet shortly. 
